Abstract: This paper deals with two-person non-zero sum games with interval pay-offs. An analytic method for solving such games is given. A pair of Nash Equilibrium is found by using the method. The analytic method is effective to find at least one Nash Equilibrium (N.E) for two-person bimatrix games. Therefore, the analytic method for two-person bimatrix games is adapted to interval bimatrix games.
Introduction


Interval game theory concerns about making decisions under conflict caused by opposing interests. Interval analysis allows us to compute with sets on the real line. In applications, interval analysis provides rigorous enclosure of solutions to model equations. For details, one can refer to [4] . Interval valued matrix, whose entries are closed intervals is proposed by many researchers to model some kind of uncertainty.
We present, in this paper an analytic method for interval bimatrix games.The method for bimatrix games provides both an elementary proof of the existence of equilibrium points and an efficient computational method for finding at least one equilibrium point. This method is an algorithm to find N.E. The algorithm was first introduced in [1] . number is defined as follows,
Interval Numbers
, 2
The set of all interval numbers is represented by .
Basic Interval Arithmetic
Let , and , be two interval numbers. The arithmetic operations are defined as follows, , , 
Comparasion Between Interval Numbers
An extensive research and wide coverage on interval D DAVID PUBLISHING arithmetic and its applications can be found in [5] . A brief comparasion on different interval orders is given in [5] on the basis of decision makers opinion.
Let , and , be two disjoint interval numbers.
is less than if and only if . This is denoted by and the relation is an extension of " " on the real line. If the closed interval numbers are overlapping, then we use the acceptability index idea suggested by [6] . If player selects the strategy and player selects the strategy , then , and , are payoffs of the player and player , respectively. Hence, a bimatrix game is determined by a pair of matrix , When payoff matrix whose entries are interval numbers, is given, the payyoff matris of two-person non-zero sum game , is represented as follows:
A mixed strategy set of player is , , … , : 0,
Similarly, a mixed strategy set of player is , , … , : 
An Analytic Method
Let , be pay-off matrixs for player and player , respectively. We assume that player has pure-strategy and player has pure-strategy , , 
where 
